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From this generalized proof principle we derive a series of induction principles so as to broaden 
the allowable forms of proofs. Also we obtain more abstract and hence better understood formaliz- 
ations of Burstall’s method. 
All proof principles are sound and semantically complete (essentially, as noticed by Manna and 
Waldinger, because Burstall’s method can be used to express “a la Floyd” proofs). However. we 
prove a stronger semantic completeness result in the sense that the propositions and lemmas 
involved in “a la Burstall” inevitability proofs can be chosen freely (at least under necessary and 
sufficient conditions that we specify accurately). 
1. Introduction 
We formalize Burstall’s intermittent assertions method [3] initially conceived for 
proving total correctness of sequential programs and generalize it to handle inevitabil- 
ity properties of nondeterministic and parallel programs. 
Programs are modeled by transition systems (Section 2) and program executions by 
sets of complete traces (Section 3) so that the study is independent of any particular 
programming language. We consider inevitability properties of programs such as 
total correctness, accessibility of a critical section, liveness of processes which must 
eventually progress, responsiveness to a request, etc. (Section 4). 
In Section 5 we derive from examples in [3, lo] a basic proof principle which is 
a very concise formulation of Burstall’s intermittent assertions method. The method is 
shown to be sound. Using transfinite (instead of finite) induction to handle unbounded 
nondeterminism, the basic induction principle is shown to be semantically complete 
under a sufficient (but not necessary) condition on execution traces and inevitable 
properties. This condition holds in particular when considering total correctness of 
programs as in [3]. It is also satisfied for unary inevitable properties which depend 
only upon final states (a restriction considered by Pnueli [1 11, Apt and Delporte [l] 
and Manna and Pnueli [9]). 
When using unary inevitable properties, relationships between initial and final 
values of program variables can only be expressed by assigning initial values to 
auxiliary variables incorporated into states. The use of auxiliary variables has the 
disadvantage that the program has to be transformed. More importantly, the use of 
auxiliary variables is in a sense too flexible: one can relate any intermediate states 
during a computation and even store entire computations. Such a free use of auxiliary 
variables is not in the spirit of [3, lo], where lemmas are always of the form “if 
sometime 4(X,, . . . . X,)AX~=-Y~A...AX,=X, at / then sometime $(x~,...,x,, 
x1, . . . . X,) at I”’ (where X1, . . . . X,) are the program variables and x1, . . . ,x, their 
respective symbolic values at program point I). This is captured in our basic induction 
principle using binary inevitable properties (better than by imposing adequate restric- 
tions on the use of auxiliary variables that would depend upon the syntax of 
programs). However, we conjecture that even for deterministic programs there are 
inevitable properties for which the use of binary assertions is not semantically 
complete. 
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This conjecture leads us in Section 6 to a generalization of Burstall’s intermittent 
assertions method using transfinite induction (to handle unbounded nondeterminism) 
and ternary intermittent assertions (thus allowing for lemmas of the more general 
form“ifsometime~(~, ,..., x,,X, ,..., X,)~X,=x,~~~~~X,=x,atIthensometime 
$4X 1 ,..., x,,xl ,..., x,,X1 ,..., X,) at I”‘, where XI, . . ..?&I (resp. x1, . . ..x.) 
denote the values of the program variables XI, .., X, on program entry (resp. at 
program point /). This generalized induction principle is then proved to be sound and 
semantically complete. 
In Section 7 we derive a series of induction principles which are successive general- 
izations of the above proof principle. This broadens the range of application 
of the method [for example, when using infinite well-ordered sets of intermittent 
assertions (which can be given finite presentations by means of auxiliary termination 
variables) Burstall’s method can be extended so as to incorporate Floyd’s method 
[7]]. Moreover, the consideration of more and more abstract formalizations 
should lead to a better understanding of Burstall’s method (for example, it is 
shown that hand-simulation and induction upon the data can be understood in 
a unified manner and reduced to computational induction in a form essentially 
more expressive than Floyd’s method [7]). The successive generalizations introduce 
more flexibility to write proofs but no additional proof power, since all considered 
proof principles are shown to be sound and semantically complete and hence 
equivalent. 
The completeness argument consists in showing that “a la Floyd” proofs can be 
reformulated using “a la Burstall” proofs (i.e. computational induction can be reduced 
to induction upon the data). However, this argument is not fully satisfactory because 
the style of the allowable proofs is fixed. Users of Burstall’s method need a stronger 
completeness result since they want to know if the lemmas that they are going to use in 
their proofs can always be chosen freely. A positive answer is given in Section 8 (with 
the necessary and sufficient condition that each lemma involves a property which is 
inevitable for the program but also relatively to the other lemmas which are used in its 
proof). 
2. Programs as transition systems 
The operational semantics of a programming language associates a transition 
system (S, t, 4) with each program of the language: 
0 S is a non-empty set of states, 
l te(S x S+{ tt, ff }) is a transition relation, understood as a function from pairs of 
states into truth values (tt is true and ff is false). t(s, s’) means that starting in state 
s and executing one program step can put the program into next state s’. A program 
is deterministic when a state may have none or one successor state. It is nondeter- 
ministic if a state s may have several different next states s’, 
l d~(S+{tt, ff)) characterizes initial states. 
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Example 2.1. Burstall [3] introduced the “intermittent assertions method” using 
examples. The first one was the following program, which computes 2” when n 3 0: 
Start: P := 1; 
Loop: if N>O then begin P:=2xP; N:=N-1; 
got0 Loop 
end; 
Finish: 
Program states are of the form (c,n,p) where the control state c is a program 
label and the memory state associates integer values n,p~Z with the program 
variables N, P: 
l S = {Start, Loop, Finish) x Z x Z. 
Execution should begin at program point “Start” with a positive initial value n 
for N and an arbitrary value p for P. Therefore, 
0 $=A(c,n,p).[c=Start r\n>O]. 
The program is total and deterministic (all but the final states have a single 
successor state): 
0 t((c,n,p),(c’,n’,p’))=[(c=Startr\c’=Loop~n’=n~p’=l) 
v(c=LoopAn>OAc’=LoopAn’=n-1 r\p’=2xp) 
v(c=Loopr\n<Or\c’=Finishr\n’=nr,p’=p)]. 
3. Program executions as complete traces 
Executions of a program (S, t, 4) will be modeled as a set C( S, t, 4) of sequences of 
states called complete execution traces. A sequence p =popl pz . in Z( S, r, 4) (where 
pi is short for p(i)), represents an execution that starts in state p,,, performs the first 
program step to reach program state pl, performs the next program step to reach 
program state p2, etc. Since execution must start in some initial state po, this sequence 
cannot be empty. When execution does not terminate, this sequence is infinite. A finite 
sequence p. . ..pn ends with a blocking state p,, which has no possible successor state. 
Therefore traces represent complete executions (as opposed to their prefixes which 
represent executions still in progress). 
More formally, 
l o is the set of natural numbers; 
l 0 is the empty set (also written 0) or zero; 
l ifn~oandn#Othennwilldenote{O,...,n-l}(sothatm~nisequivalenttom<~); 
l if E is a set then Ewx={y~E: y#x} and 115 is the cardinality of E; 
. BE(S--t{ttff}), 
p = is. [VS’ES.~ t( s, s’)] characterizes blocking states; 
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0 C”(S,t,+)=& empty traces, are not considered; 
0 C”(S,t,f$)=(pE(n+S): ~(po)AVi~(n-l).t(pi,Pi+l)AP(p,_,)}: finite complete 
traces of length n > 0; 
0 Z”(S,t,c$)={pE(w+S): ~(po)AVi~w.t(pi,pi+l)}: infinite traces; 
l WJ&=U,,, C”( S, t, 4 ) u C” (S, t, 4 ): complete traces. 
Example 3.1. A complete trace for the program in Example 2.1 with N = 3 and P = p _ 
as starting condition would be 
(Start, 3, p) (Loop, 3,1> (Loop, 2,2) (Loop, L4) 
(Loop, 0,8 ) ( Finish, 0,8 ). 
4. Inevitability properties of programs 
A property $ is inevitable for a program if any program execution eventually leads 
to a state satisfying $. Termination, total correctness or absence of individual 
starvation of parallel processes are examples of inevitability properties of programs. 
More formally, $E(S x S+{ tt, ff }) is inevitable for (S, t, 4) if and only if 
where Dam(p) is the domain of function (or relation) p, Rng(p) its range and 
Fld(p)=Dom(p)uRng(p) its field. 
Extending Dijkstra’s definitions of weak and strong termination [6], we say that 
$E(S x S+{tC ff>) is strongly inevitable for (S, t, 4) if and only if 
VS~S.3k~o.Vp~C(S,t,~).[(po=s)~(3i~k.~(pO,pi))]. 
In other words, inevitability is strong when the number i of program steps necessary 
for reaching the “final” state pi is bounded by an integer k depending only on the 
“initial” state po. 
ljE(S x S+{tt, ff}) . IS weakly inevitable for (S, t, C$I ) if and only if t,G is inevitable for 
(S, t, 4) but not strongly. 
Example 4.1. The program in Example 2.1 computes P = 2” when the initial value n of 
N is positive. This total correctness property can be expressed formally by the 
statement that 
$=A((c,n,p),(c’,n’,p’)).[c’=Finishr\p’=2”] 
is inevitable. Termination is strong since traces have n+ 3 states when initially 
N=n>O. 
Program properties are expressed using sets (or their characteristic functions) and 
not formal languages. This is because we want to get rid of those incompleteness 
problems which are due to the inconvenient choice of assertion languages which are 
not expressive enough in order to describe these sets. 
5. The basic induction principle underlying Burstall’s intermittent assertions method 
In this section we work out a basic induction principle which is a very concise 
formulation of Burstall’s method. In the next section we shall relax a number of 
restrictions which cause incompleteness problems and derive more abstract and 
general induction principles which generalize Burstall’s method. 
The best way to convince the reader that our basic induction principle indeed 
corresponds to Burstall’s method would be to derive it from an already existing 
formalization of the method. Since no such existing formalization is general enough 
and widely accepted, the best we can do is to start from Burstall’s proof of the 
program in Example 2.1 [3] using Manna and Waldinger’s notations [lo]. The 
treatment of Burstall’s other examples is similar but would be too long to be included 
here. 
5. I. Prouing inevitability properties of programs 
The total correctness of the program in Example 2.1 is specified by the following 
proposition: 
l if sometime n >, 0 A N = n at Start then sometime P = 2” at Finish. 
The proof of this proposition involves the following lemma: 
l ifsometimen~Or\N=nr\P=patLoopthensometimeN=Or\P=px2”atLoop. 
Burstall observed that in the above statements n and p are mathematical variables 
whereas N and P are not since their meaning depends on context. The use of both 
mathematical and program variables in the same statement might be confusing (for 
example, from N = n and N = 0 we cannot conclude that n = 0 in the above lemma). 
This confusion can be avoided if we get rid of program variables using different 
mathematical variables to denote values of program variables at different “time 
instants”. For example, the lemma could be written as follows: 
l if sometime n 20 at Loop then sometime n’ = 0 A p’ =p x 2” at Loop. 
This means: 
“For all n, if rz 30 holds and execution of the program is started at label Loop with 
program variables N and P having values II and p then control will eventually pass 
through Loop with some values n’ and p’ of the program variables N and P such 
that n’ = 0 A p’ = p x 2” is satisfied”. 
Therefore the lemma simply asserts that 
8,=i~((c,n,p),(c’,rz’,p’)).[c’=Loop~n’=O~p’=px2”) 
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is inevitable for (S, t, co ), where 
&~=;1(C,n,p).[c=LoopAn30]. 
Similarly, the proposition asserts the inevitability of 
f3,=I_((c,n,p),(c’,n’,p’)).[c’=Finishr\p’=2”] 
for (S, t, .sl ), where 
More generally, for proving that Ic/ is inevitable for (S, t, 4), Burstall’s method 
consists in discovering auxiliary properties { 0+(S2+{tt, ff}): l~/i} and correspond- 
ing initial conditions {c,~(S+{tt, ff 1): l~,4) (such that I.~E~.[E~=c#I A~?,=I,!J]) which 
are all shown to be inevitable: 
Only a finite number, 1 A 1, of lemmas should be used. 
Remark. Since Burstall [3] considered only deterministic and total programs, the 
statement 
if sometime P( n, p) at L then sometime Q(n, p, n’, p’) at L’ 
can also be understood as 
3s~C(S,t,&).3i~Dom(s).B(so,Si), 
where 
All results in the present paper can very easily be adapted to this existential 
interpretation. However, we have chosen to develop the universal interpretation 
because it is more suitable for total correctness (and more generally inevitability 
properties) of nondeterministic programs with depth search execution, [S] hence 
parallel programs. 
5.2. An example of proof 
Now that we have obtained an abstract formalization of programs and inevitable 
properties of programs, let us come back to the example in order to capture the 
essence of Burstall’s proof method. 
The proof of proposition 8r is the following. 
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Assume: 
sometime N >, 0 A N = n at Start 
then by hand simulation: 
sometime N>Or\ N=nr\P=l at Loop 
then using lemma 8,: 
sometime N = 0 A P = 2” at Loop 
then by hand simulation: 
sometime P=2” at Finish 
Q.E.D. 
The proof of lemma B0 is by induction on n as follows: 
Assume: 
sometime N>OAN=nAP=p at Loop 
either N<O and Q.E.D. 
or N > 0 and then by hand simulation: 
sometime N>~AN=~-~AP=PX~~~ Loop 
then using lemma B,, as induction hypothesis for n- 1 
(such that n > n - 13 0): 
sometime N = 0 A P = p x 2” at Loop 
Q.E.D. 
f13J 
f12J 
illJ 
rlOJ 
(021 
(OlJ 
(OOJ 
5.3. Intermittent assertions 
In [3], a proof of a lemma o1 is a nonempty finite sequence [;I, . . . . I:, I? of 
intermittent assertions derived from one another by hand simulation or application of 
lemmas. 
For example, the proof of proposition (!I1 involved the discovery of the following 
intermittent assertions: 
If=jb((c,n,p),(c’,n’,p’)).[c’=Startr\n’>Or\n’=n], 
I:=~((c,n,p),(c’,n’,p’)).[c’=LoopAn’~Or\n’=n/\p’=l], 
whereas the proof of lemma o0 involves the discovery of 
I~=3.((c,n,p),(c’,n’,p’)).[c’=Loopr\n’30r\n’=nr\p’=p], 
Z~=R((c,n,p),(c’,n’,p’)).[r’=Loopr\n’>Or\n’=n-1 Ap’=pX2], 
I~=A((c,n,p),(c’,n’,p’)).[c’=Loopr\n’=Or\p’=px2”]. 
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Remark 1. The intermittent assertions involved in the proof need not be different, as 
shown by the following counterexample, which is a valid proof of proposition 8, for 
all finite k 3 1: 
: 
sometime N 30 A N =n at Start (premise) 
sometime N > 0 A N = n A P = 1 at Loop (hand-simulation) 
k times 
sometime N =0 A P= 2” at Loop (lemma) 
. . . . . . 
sometime N = 0 A P = 2” at Loop (lemma) 
sometime P=2” at Finish (conclusion). 
Remark 2. According to Burstall [3], “ [sometime P at L J says that there exists 
a state during the execution which is at L and has property P”. Stated otherwise, all 
intermittent assertions 1: involved in the inevitability proof of lemma 8i should be 
inevitable for (S, t, cl). This interpretation of intermittent assertions is inconsistent. 
For example I h never holds during execution when initially N = 0. More generally, 
Burstall treats tests by case analysis [3], so that the intermittent assertions involved in 
each case might not be inevitable for those initial states not corresponding to the 
considered case. We shall choose another interpretation of intermittent assertions so 
that case analysis causes no problem since only the disjunction of the intermittent 
assertions corresponding to all cases will have to be inevitable for all initial states. 
5.4. Verljication conditions 
In a valid proof of inevitability of & for (S, t,El), intermittent assertions 
I y’, , I:, Zp are derived from one another according to rules (for computing the effect 
of an assignment or test, for using a lemma, etc.). Burstall’s informal rules [3] can be 
understood as verification conditions that must be satisfied by the intermittent 
assertions. These verification conditions are now expressed formally. 
5.4.1. Premises 
All proofs in [3] start with the assumption of the premises sl of the proposition or 
lemma 8, which is proved. Stated otherwise, 1;’ should hold when the current state s’ is 
an initial state s: 
vS,S’ES.([El(S)AS’=S]~z;‘(S,S’)) 
or, more simply, 
vsES.(&i(S) * Il’(s,s)). 
For instance, the proof of proposition 8i starts with the check that 
\J(c,n,P)ES.(&1((c,n,P))~l:((c,n,p),(c,n,p))) 
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(where c=Start and n 20 or else s1 is false so that the verification condition is 
obviously true), whereas for lemma B0 we have 
vJ(c,n,p)ES.(&O(c,n,p))=>l~((c,n,p),(c,n,p))) 
(where c = Loop, n 30 in the nonevident case). 
5.4.2. Hand simulation 
Assume that the proof of proposition 8, worked forward until reaching intermittent 
assertion If which is not the last one. The next step in the proof can be taken by hand 
simulation. 
For total deterministic programs, Burstall’s rules for computing the effect of an 
assignment or test [3] check that the current state s’ satisfying 1f has a successor state 
s” satisfying some intermittent assertion Z{ which has to be taken into consideration 
later in the proof so that j < i: 
[lf(s,s’)~t(s’,s”)] *Slj<i.Ij(s,s”). 
For example, in the proof of proposition 8,) assignment P:= 1 leads from r 13 J to 
f 12 J and corresponds to the following verification condition: 
C~~((c,n,p),(c’,n’,p’))~~((c’,n’,p’),(c”,n”,p”)l 
where c’ = Start, n’ 20, n’ = n or the condition is obviously verified. The test N ~0 
leads from r 11 J to f 10 J and corresponds to the verification condition 
where c’=Loop, n’>O, p’=2”, c”=Finish, n”=n’, p”=p’). 
In the proof of lemma Q,,, the loop body leads from CO2 J to TO1 J (In accordance 
with the operational semantics of the program in Example 2.1, the loop body should 
be treated as an atomic action.) The corresponding verification condition is 
wherec’=Loop,n’=n,p’=p,n’>O,c”=Loop,n”=n’-l,p”=2xp’orthecondition 
is trivially satisfied. 
Such verification conditions are not sufficient when nondeterminism is involved 
since it must also be proved that no blocking state is reachable. Hence, hand 
simulation should ensure the existence of at least one successor state: 
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and check that all possible successor states satisfy some intermittent assertion 
considered later: 
5.4.3. Using lemmas in the proof of propositions 
In the proof of proposition 8,) intermittent assertion f 11 J is derived from f 12 J 
using lemma oO. It must first be checked that all current states s’ satisfying r 11 J also 
satisfy the premises a,, of lemma do. Then, by applying the lemma it must be proved 
that all successors s” of s’ by tIO satisfy r 12 J . The corresponding verification 
conditions are the following: 
where in the nonbanal case c’= Loop, n’>O, n’=n, p’= 1, cl’= Loop, n”=O, 
p”=p’ x 2”‘. 
More generally, the verification condition corresponding to the use of a lemma in 
the proof of a proposition is (temporarily) 
Vs,s’ES.[lf(s,s’)~(3/‘E/1.[&I~(s’)AVs”~S.[~I,(s’,s”)~ ilj<i.I{(s,s")]])]. 
Observe that (contrary to the case of hand simulation) the test that current states s’ 
satisfy the premises cl, of lemma &, ensures the existence of at least one successor s” to 
s’ (unless improbably &, is the identity lemma, i.e. Q,,( s’, s”) => (s’ = s”)). This is 
because lemma BIS is separately proved to be inevitable for C( S, t, Ed,). 
Apropos of the use of lemmas, notice that Burstall relies upon the mathematical 
culture of his readers and does not take the trouble to state elementary logical rules 
such as “proofs of lemmas and propositions should not be circular” [3]. Yet such rules 
have to be captured in the formalization of Burstall’s method. A simple way consists in 
partially ordering the set n of lemmas by a well-founded ordering CK such that 1 ‘oc 1 
is understood as “the inevitability proof of &, does not depend upon the assumption 
that 611 is inevitable”. The (permanent) verification condition corresponding to the use 
of a lemma in the proof of a proposition is now the following: 
vs,S’ES.[zf(S,S’)~(31’E/1.[l’~IA&I~(S’)AvS”ES.[e,‘(S’,S”) 
* 3 j<i.Z~(s,s")]])]. 
Moreover, since the set n is finite and cx is well-founded we can always (up to 
a rank function) choose /1 as a set of positive numbers and K as the corresponding 
natural ordering <. 
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5.4.4. A little induction 
Burstall proves lemmas using various forms of the principle of mathematical 
induction [3] which are all equivalent to the following: 
For example, in the proof of lemma do, intermittent assertion (00 J is derived from 
assertion (01 J using lemma (I0 as induction hypothesis. This is valid because 
I~((c,n,p),<c’,n’,p’))~C&O((c’,n’,p’))~n’<nl. 
Then, by induction hypothesis, we derive intermittent assertion 1: such that 
where c’=Loop, n’>O, n’=n-1, p’=px2, c”=Loop, n”=O,p”=p’x2”‘. 
This verification condition is specific of the example considered but, in general, 
Burstall specifies that the induction is on the data [3]. Since the above principle of 
mathematical induction applies to natural numbers, induction on data involves a map 
f0 from the data into natural numbers. For example, 
where 
Since proofs of different lemmas are usually different, different maps 1; may have to 
be used, hence f~( A+(S+o)). We infer from the example that the verification 
condition for the use of a lemma as induction hypothesis in the proof of this lemma 
should be of the form 
=s 3j<iJ;(s,s”)])]. 
5.4.5. Conclusion 
Starting from the premises E, of a lemma, a proof of this lemma ends when some 
intermittent assertion If has been derived which implies the conclusion 8, of the 
lemma: 
V’s,S’ES.[Zf(S,S’) * 0,(&S’)]. 
For instance, the proof of proposition 81 ends with. 
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where c’ = Finish, p’ = 2” in the nontrivial case, whereas the proof of lemma o0 ends 
either with 
where c’=Loop, n’=O, n’=n, p’=p, 
or with 
I~((c,n,p),(c’,n’,p’)) ~eO((c,n,P),(c’,n’,P’)), 
where c’=Loop, n’=O, p’=p x 2”. 
Finally, observe that in a proof all intermediate intermittent assertions should be 
processed (either by hand simulation or by using a lemma (in the proof of a proposi- 
tion or as induction hypothesis)) or imply the conclusion. 
5.5. The basic induction principle formalizing Burstall’s intermittent assertions method 
We can now sum up what we have learned from the example. 
For proving 
vP~C(S,t,~).3i~Dom(P).~(P~,Pi)~ 
Burstall’s method consists in proving the following: 
[3AEw,EE(A+(S+(tt, ff})), B+l+(S2+{tt, ff}))&(A+(S+C0)), 
iE(A-+o). 
(37cEn.[En=~Aen=~]) A 
(Vl~~.311~(nl+l~(S2~{tt,ff})). 
(0) 
Vi<n,, s,s’ES. 
(P) C&I(S) * r;l(s, s)l A 
[lf(s,s’)* 
(HS) (3s”~S.t(s’,s”)r\Vs”~S.[t(s’,s”)~3j<i.Z~(s,s”)]) v 
(LI) (~~‘E~.[((~‘</)V(~‘=IA~;(S’)<~;(S)))AE,,(S’)AVS”ES.(B,,(S’,S”) 
* 3 j<i.Z!(s,s”))]) v 
(C) ws, s’)l)l. 
(1) 
5.6. Soundness and completeness issues about Burstall’s method 
The question of soundness and completeness of Burstall’s method has already been 
tackled partially. Representing programs by transition relations, the nondeterminism 
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of which is bounded, and giving a temporal interpretation of the intermittent 
assertions method, Pnueli proved the soundness and semantic completeness of a 
version of Burstall’s method [l 11. Similar arithmetical soundness and completeness 
results were obtained by Apt and Delporte for sequential deterministic structured 
programs [l]. Completeness results also follow informally from Manna and 
Waldinger’s remark that the intermittent assertions method can be used to express 
conventional “a la Floyd” partial correctness and termination proofs that use the 
well-founded set approach [lo], a method which is known to be semantically 
complete. 
However, the exact scope of the above results should be interpreted very cautiously 
since these proofs only deal with the case of unary intermittent assertions (i.e. which 
assert a property of states, such as “if sometime P(s) at L then sometime Q( s’) at L’ “) 
whereas Burstall’s method and induction principle (1) make use of binary intermittent 
assertions (i.e. which relate states, such as “if sometime P(s) at L then sometime 
Q(s,s’) at L’“). It is often argued that both approaches are equivalent because the 
effect of binary assertions can be obtained using auxiliary variables and unary 
assertions. Indeed, initial or intermediate values of program variables can be stored 
into auxiliary variables the value of which is part of the state. In fact, the use of 
auxiliary variables and unary assertions is more powerful than the use of binary 
assertions as in (1). This is because using auxiliary variables one can express relation- 
ships between values of the variables at any two different moments in the course of the 
computation (and even store entire execution traces into history variables). This is not 
possible with binary assertions since, for example, only the main proposition (and not 
all lemmas) can depend upon the initial values of the program variables in induction 
principle (1). However, the use of binary assertions appears to be much more 
disciplined because the question of when auxiliary variables do have to be introduced 
is solved once for all. 
Our understanding with respect to soundness and completeness of induction 
principle (1) can be described as follows. 
5.6.1. Soundness 
Theorem 5.1 (soundness). (1) = (0) 
Proof. We introduce in Section 6 the induction principle (2) an obvious generaliz- 
ation of (1) (so that (1) = (2)) and prove that (2) a(O). 0 
5.6.2. Conjectures about semantic incompleteness 
Although induction principle (1) only allows to use ranges of natural numbers, it 
can be used to prove termination of weakly but not strongly terminating programs. 
We show this using the following example (taken from [6, p. 3561): 
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Example 5.2. In general, the program (X and Y being natural constants), 
x, y:=x, Y, 
do x > 0 + x, y := x - 1, any natural number 
0 y>o+y:=y-1 
od 
does not enjoy the property of strong termination, because for X > 0 no upper bound 
for y can be given. 
Weak termination can be proved by Floyd’s method using the left lexicographic 
ordering on pairs of natural numbers (x, y) < (x’, y’) if and only if (x <x’) v 
(X=X’A y<y’). 
This can also be proved by induction principle (1). We have S= Z2, 
t=%((x,y),(x’,y’)).[(x>OAx’=x-l)v(y>0Ax’=xAy’=y-l)], f#J=J.(x,y). 
[x=X2O~y=Y20], $=~~((x,y),(x’,y’)).[x’=y’=O] and choose n=X+2, 
&X+1=~,~I((~,y))=[x=I]forI~(X+1),8,=IC/forI~(X+2),n=X+1,fi((x,y))= 
Y for MX+% no=& ~~((~,Y),(~‘,Y’))=(Eo((x,Y))A(x’,Y’)=(x, Y)) C(P), F-2 
when y’=O, (HS) when y’>O], ZA((x,y), (x’,y’))=(x=Or\ y>Or\t((x,y), 
(x’,y’))) [(LI) with Z’=Z=O], Ii=&, [(C)l, when Z=l,...,X, ni=2, Z:((x,y),(x’, 
Y’))=(EI((X,Y))A(X’,Y’)=(X,Y)) [F’h (WI, ~:((x,Y),(~‘,Y’))=(&I((x, 
y))~t((x,y), (x’,y’))) [(LI) with /‘=1-l when x’=x-1, (LI) with I’=1 when 
~‘=~andy’=y-~l,~~=~,C(~)l,~x+1=1~~~+I((x~~),(x’,~‘))=(~X+1((~,~))~ 
(x’,y’)=(x,y))[(P),(LI)withl’=X],Z i + i = 0; + i [(C)l. (The check of the verifica- 
tion conditions is left to the reader. We have indicated after each intermittent 
assertion which alternative should be chosen.) 
As shown by the above example, the greater generality of Burstall’s method 
restricted to natural numbers (which can be used to prove termination of weakly but 
not strongly terminating programs) over Floyd’s method restricted to natural num- 
bers (which can be used to prove only strong termination) is only seeming, because 
Burstall’s method implicitly relies upon the lexicographic ordering on pairs of natural 
numbers as pointed out by induction principle (1). 
Despite this apparent superiority, the order type of the lexicographic ordering on 
pairs of natural numbers involved in induction principle (1) is not as high as necessary 
when considering arbitrarily unbounded nondeterminism. Therefore we make the 
following semantic incompleteness conjecture: (0) + (1). 
By analogy with Floyd’s method, two remedies can be considered in order to solve 
incompleteness problems related to unbounded nondeterminism. One consists in 
considering only bounded nondeterminism. The other consists in considering induc- 
tion over arbitrary well-orderings (or up to an isomorphism over arbitrary ordinals). 
However, we risk the conjecture that induction principle (1) is not complete even with 
these simplifying hypotheses neither for bounded nondeterminism: 
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[(O) A V’SES.(I { s’~S.t(s, s’)}) <w)] + (1) nor for arbitrary well-orderings: 
(0) + [(l), where f~(n+(S+d)), d~0u.Q (Ord is the class of ordinals). 
These conjectures follow from the remark that except for trivial examples (that can 
be handled by hand simulation) proofs involve a well-founded relation on the set of 
descendants of initial states corresponding to (A x S, < ), where (I’, s’) < (I, s) if and 
only if (I’< 1 v (I’= 1 r\fi(s’)<J(s))). Although there is (by the inevitability assump- 
tion) a well-founded relation on the set of descendants of each initial state, there may 
exist no such well-founded relation on the set of descendants of all initial states as 
necessary in induction principle (1) because fi does not depend upon initial states. This 
is the case for S=o,t(x,x’)=[x’=x+l], 4(.x)=& $(x,x’)=[.Y’=~x]. 
5.6.3. A partial semantic completeness result 
The above conjectures have only limited consequences because they do not apply in 
a great number of practical situations. 
One such situation is when nondeterminism is bounded and the number of initial 
states is finite so that (at least in theory) proofs can be entirely done by hand 
simulation. 
More interesting situations are those of total correctness of sequential programs 
considered in [3] or unary intermittent assertions considered in [ll, 11. Both 
situations can be coped with as particular cases of the following partial 
semantic completeness result. 
We say that 
l state s is intermediate for (S, t, 4, rl/) when there is some execution trace such that 
$ does not hold up to s; 
l state s is a goal for (S, t, 4, $) when $ holds for the first time at s on some execution 
trace; 
l state s is accessible for (S, t, 4, $) when s is an intermediate or a goal state; 
l the inevitability of $ is initial states independent for (S, t, 4) when no intermediate 
state can be a goal. 
Definitions 5.3. (Intermediate, goal and accessible states, initial states independence). 
0 Inrer(S,t,@,$)($={sES: 3pEC(S,t,4), iCDom(p). pO=SAVj<ii.l$(p,,pj)A 
Inter(S,t,4,*)=tJ{I nter(S,t,4,$>(s): sES}, 
l Goal(S,t,4,IC,)($={s~S: 3pcZ(S,t,4), iEDom(p). po=pAvj<i.l$(po,Pj)A 
Pizs A ti(PO,Pi)t3 
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l Acc(S,t,~,rl/>(S)=Znter<S,t,~,~)(S)uGoal<S,t,#,~)(s), 
Act ( S, t, 4, $ > = Inter ( S, t, 4, Ic/ > u Goal< S, t, 4, $ >, 
l Zsind(S,t,~,$)=[Znter(S,t,~,$)nGoal(S,t,~,$)=@]. 
When this (sufficient but not necessary) initial states independence condition is 
satisfied, inevitability properties can be proved by (1) with f~(/i+(S-+d)) for some 
A E Or-d. 
Before proving this fact we must characterize the ordinal A which is necessary; 
stated otherwise, we propose a “measure” of the global nondeterminism of the 
program (as opposed to local characterizations of nondeterminism such as the 
so-called bounded nondeterminism [6]). 
l We write Rel( W, -c) to state that < is a relation on W represented by its 
characteristic function: 
Rel(W,<)=[Wx WcDom(_Or\Rng(<)={tt,ff}]. 
l We write Wf( W,--c) to state that --c is a well-founded relation on W 
Wf( W,<)=[Rel( W,--C)AVEC W.[Ef0~3y~E.(Vz~E.~(z -c y))]] 
(this implies that there is no sequence PE(o--+ W) such that pi+ 1 --c pi for all igo. 
Assuming the axiom of choice, this property is equivalent to the above definition). 
l The left restriction of relation t to E is written tlE: 
tjE(s,s’)=[seEr, t(s,s’)]. 
et -’ is the inverse of relation t: 
t-‘(s’,s)=t(s,s’). 
We first prove the following lemma. 
Lemma 5.4 (Existence of a well-founded relation for inevitability proofs (with initial 
states independence hypothesis)). 
Proof. Assume by reductio ad absurdum that 3p@o+Acc( S, t, 4, $>).Vi~o. tl Zn- 
ter( S, t, 4, $)(pi9pi+ 1). We can assume that 4(po) holds (else we can adjoin to the left 
of p a prefix rO...rk of a trace of C(Acc(S, t,$,$), tlZnter(S, t,c$,$),cb> such that 
q5(ro) holds). By (0) there is a smallest iEDom(p) such that $(po,pi) holds. Hence 
piEGoal(S,t,c#,$). Also tlZnter(S,t,c$,$)(pi3pi+l) implies p+Znter(S,t,~,rC,) in 
contradiction with Zsind( S, t, 4, $). 0 
Let E be a class of ordinals. Sup(E)= U E will denote the least upper bound of 
E and Sup + (E) will denote the least strict upper bound of E. 
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The rank of XE W with respect to a well-founded relation Wf( W, <) is an ordinal 
defined by transfinite recursion on W as follows: 
rk( W,d )(x)=Sup+{rk( W,--c )(y): y--c x). 
The rank of a well-founded relation Wf( W,k ) is 
rk( W,<)=Sup+ {rk( W,-c)(x): XE W} 
The global nondeterminism of (S, t, C#J >with respect to $ can be measured by the 
rank of the inverse of t left restricted to intermediate states: 
Definition 5.5 (Rank of the global nondeterminism (with initial states independence 
hypothesis)). When (0) and Isind (S, t, 4, rc/) hold, we define 
rkgrzd(S,t,~,C1/)=rk(Acc(S,t,~,*),tlInter(S,t,~,GI/)-‘). 
Remark. Observe that if the nondeterminism is locally bounded (i.e. VSES. I{s’: 
t(s, s’) 11 <w) then rkgnd (S, t, 4, $) d w. Similarly, if the nondeterminism is locally 
countable (i.e. Vs~S.l{s’: t(s,s’)}l<~) then rkgnd(S,t,&$)dwl. Finally, if t is 
recursive (i.e. effectively calculable) then rkgnd ( S, t, 4, II/ ) d cuyK (where w T” is 
Church-Kleene’s first nonrecursive ordinal [2]). 
We can now state the partial completeness result concerning Burstall’s method. 
Theorem 5.6 (Partial semantic completeness). 
C(o)~rsind(S,t,~,~)l=>C(l) with f~(~~(S-trkynd(S,t,~,~)))l. 
Proof. Assume (0) and Isind( S, t, C#J, t b). Let us choose n = 2, co(s)= 
[sEAcc(S,t,4,r1/>1, ~o(&S’l=l[3P~~(S,t,+), i~oom(p).(Vj<i.l~(p~, Pj)IA 
*(Po,Pi)A((3k,<i.p,=s)Api=s’l, fo~(Acc(S,t,~,cC/)~rkgnd(S,t,~,*)), .h(~ = 
rk(Acc(S,t,qkII/), tllnter<S,t,h Ic/>-'1, no=2, I;(S,S’)=[EO(S)AS’=S], I~(s,s’)= 
[&O(S)AlBg(S,S)At(S,S')], I;=&, &I=$, e,=lj, ?21=1, I:(S,S’)=[E1(S)AS’=S], 
Iy=O1, TC= 1. All verification conditions are obviously satisfied but for VS,S’ES. 
(I;(S,S')Al&(S, S’))~(f0(S’)<,f0(S)AEO(S’)AvS”ES.e,(S’,S~)~r~(S,S”)). 
If I~(s,s’)~i~,(s,s’) holds, we have, by definition of Zh, s0 and (0), that 
~P~~(S,t,~),iEDom(P).(Vj<i.l~(P,,pj))A~(Po,Pi)A\k.(s=P,A(k+l)< 
iAs’=pk+,). Since s,s’EZnter(S,t,&$) and t(s,s’) holds, we have &(s’)< 
fo(s)r\cO(s’). If tI,,(s’,s”) then 3qEC(S,t,4), i’EDom(q). (Vj<i’.l$(pO, 
pj))A\(Po,Pi,)A(3k’di’.q,‘=S’)Aqi’=S”. We have Vj.(k’<j<i’)*lll/(p,,qj) 
since otherwise for the smallest j satisfying k’< jci’ A $(pO, qj), we would have 
qjElnter( S, t, C/I,+) nGoal(S, t, 4, $). Observe that q,,EGoal( S, t, 4,$) SO that 
$(pO, qi’) holds since, otherwise, qi, would be an intermediate state of the trace po.. . pk 
qk’...qi. . . . . Since s=p, and s”=qi’ we conclude that Bo(s,s”), hence Zz(s,s”) hold. q 
The above partial semantic completeness result applies to proofs of inevitability 
properties such that goal states have no successor state. 
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Theorem 5.7. 
Proof. Assume that s~Goal(S, t, 4, $). We have Vs’~s.1 t(s,s’). It follows that 
s$lnter( S, t, qb, II/) since otherwise there exists nE(o -O), ~EZ’“( S, t, 4) such that 
ViEn.l$(p,,pi), in contradiction with (0). 0 
As corollary, we obtain that Burstall’s [3] total correctness proof method for 
sequential programs (i.e. (1) with f~(,4+(S+w))) 1s semantically complete because 
program exit states have no successor states and only deterministic programs are 
considered. 
Theorem 5.6 also applies to [l 1, l] because they only consider unary intermittent 
assertions (i.e. relational intermittent assertions are expressed using auxiliary vari- 
ables the value of which is part of the state). 
Theorem 5.8. 
Proof. IfsEZnter(S,t,~,IC/)nGoal(S,t,~,IC,), there are s’,s”~S such that lIc/(s’,s) 
and $(s”,s), a contradiction. 0 
6. The basic induction principle generalizing Burstall’s intermittent assertions method 
Although induction principle (1) is sound and semantically complete in a great 
number of practical situations, we conjecture that it is not general enough to cope 
with some types of inevitability properties of programs, such as those considered 
in [lo] for cyclic programs. Hence the necessity arises of generalizing induction 
principle (1). 
The proposed generalization is quite simple. In order to ensure the existence of 
well-orderings to be used for induction, lemmas and intermittent assertions should 
depend upon initial states. Transfinite well-orderings should be used in order to cope 
with unbounded nondeterminism. These remarks lead from (1) to (2), the last induc- 
tion principle (2) being later shown to be semantically complete. 
[MEW, &E(Ll+P+{tt, ff})), 8+l-*(S3+(tt, ff})), 
de&d, &(A + (S2+A)), ne(A+o). 
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(2) 
In order to illustrate the use of this induction principle, let us consider the following 
example. 
Example 6.1. $(x,x’)=[x’=~x] is inevitable for (w,t,4) such that t(x,x’)=[x’= 
x+ 1] and $(x)=tt. 
Observe that we do not have W’( Acc( S, t, 4, $), tl Inter( S, t, 4, $) - l ). 
The inevitability of $ can be proved by induction principle (2) by choosing A = 2, 
71=1,E~(~,X)=[X.~x~2~],B~(~,X,X’)=[~~X~2~=X’],d=W,f~(_Y,X)=[2~-X], 
~I(-x,x)=cx=xl , 0,(&X,Xr)=[5=XAX’=2X], n0=2, I$(&x,x’)=[x<x= 
x’<2x] (satisfying (P) and (C) when x’=2x or (HS) when x’<2x), 
I~(~,~,x’)=[~d.u<.x+ 1 =x’<2&] (satisfying(L1) with I’=l=O), Zg=8, (C), nl= 1, 
I~(~,.x,x’)=[~=x=x’] ((P), (LI) with l’=O), Zy=tI, (C). 
Induction principle (2) is an obvious generalization of (1). 
Theorem 6.2 (Generalization of Burstall’s method). (1) a (2). 
Before tackling the question of semantic completeness, we define which ordinals 
A~0rd are sufficient in a proof by (2). 
Definition 6.3 (Rank qf the global nondeterminism). When (0) holds, we define 
rkgnd(S,t,~,IC/)=Sup’{rk(Acc(S,f,~,~)(s), 
tlrnter(S,t,~,II/)(S)-‘): sES}. 
(This definition is justified by the fact that for all SE& tl Inter( S, t, q5, $)(s) is well- 
founded on Act (S, t, 4, $ ) (5). This is proved in [4].) 
The proof of semantic completeness of (2) follows from the remark that (2) can be 
used to express “a la Floyd” proofs. 
Theorem 6.4 (Semantic completeness). (0) * ((2), with A = rkgnd ( S, t, q5, $ )). 
Intermittenr assertions induction principles 143 
pj)A~(p,,pi)A~=PoA3k~i.p,=sApi=s’],f, is useless, ni=l, I:(~S,S’)=[S=S= 
s’ A cj+)] (satisfies (P) and (LI) with l’=O), 1: =dl, n0=2, I$(s,s,s’)= [Q,(~s)AS’=S] 
(satisfies (P) and (C) or (HS)), IA(&s,s’)= [Ed A iBo(&s,s) A t(s,s’)] (satisfies 
(LI) with I’=0 and fo(~s)=rk(,4cc(S,t,$,$)(~), tlrnter(S,t,~,*)(s)-l)(s) and 
Zz = f30 (satisfies (C)). 
7. Equivalent induction principles generalizing Burstall’s intermittent assertions method 
We now derive a series of induction principles which are all shown to be sound and 
complete and hence equivalent to the basic induction principle (2). For the sake of 
conciseness, not all conceivable alternatives have been reported. One purpose of the 
series of induction principles is to propose more and more abstract formalizations 
that should lead to a better understanding of Burstall’s method. The other purpose of 
the following proof principles is to broaden the allowed forms of proofs (so as to 
introduce more flexibility in writing proofs but no additional proof power since all 
principles are equivalent). 
The number of lemmas (al, e,), lid which can be used in induction principle (2) is 
finite. Hence an informal proposition such as 
l if sometime x d X=x d 2x then sometime x d x d 2x = X _ - 
has to be understood as a single lemma of name, say 0, such that 
a0(x,x)=[5<x625] and 60(~,x,x’)=[~<x<2~=x’]. Eliminating this restriction 
on names of lemmas, the above informal proposition can also be understood as 
a shorthand for an infinite number of lemmas of name x such that E,(X) = [x < x < 2x1 
and Qx(x, x’) = [x G x 9 2~ =x’]. This point of view is consistent with the fact that the 
sole purpose of program initial state 2 in induction principle (2) is to offer the ability to 
use well-orderings for induction on the data that depend upon program initial states. 
These well-orderings can also be distinguished by giving them different names, one per 
program initial state. Also the main proposition (4, $) need not be the consequence 
of a single lemma (E,, 0,) as in (2) but could also be the consequence of different 
lemmas for different program initial states. These remarks lead to the following 
induction principle. 
CUE&-d, fZ(/i+(S+{tt, ff})), B+G(SZ+{tt, ff})), 
AEOrd, f~(/l+(s+A)), n~(A-w). 
VSES.~~EA.(E,(S)=~(S)AVS’ES.~,(S,S’)=$(S,S’))A 
(vaE/i.3z,E(n,+ l+(S2+{tt, ff))). 
Vidn,, s,s’~S. 
[&a(S) * 12th s)] A (3) 
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Theorem 7.1. (2) =S (3). 
Proof. The objects which are different in induction principles (2) and (3) but have been 
given the same name (such as A, E, . .) will be referred to using indices 2 and 3 (such as 
A2,A3,a2,c3 ,...) in the proof. 
By the axiom of choice, there is an ordinal .Z and a one-to-one function 6 that maps 
E into S. C x A2 well-ordered by the lexicographic ordering (s’, 1’) -C (s, /) if and 
only if ((s’ < s) v (s’ = s A 1’ <I)) is isomorphic with A, ic C ( k is ordinal multiplica- 
tion) by the order isomorphism I= i( s, I). [( A2 9 s) 4 I], ( i is ordinal addition). We 
let (a,z) be the inverse of r so that ~E((A~ icZ)+C), j.~((il~ icZ)-+Az) and 
VZE(A~AZ).[CI=~((~(U),E,(C()))]. We choose A,=A, ice, &3=;1C(.I”S.[&2~(z)(8 
(a(r)),s)l,B3=;(2.j.(s,s’).CeZ~(a)(6(~(X)),s,S’)l, A,=&, f3=~.a.ns.Cfi~col,(s(~(~)),s)l, 
fl3 = ~.~.~2;.,a,, 13~=~.(~,~‘).1~~~,,(b(c~(x)),s,s’). It follows that E~~,(~~I(~),~,))(s)=~(s) 
and 19~~((6 I,,,,,,,J(s, s’)= $(s, s’). The other verification conditions are obvious to 
check. 0 
The names CCEA of the lemmas (a,, 6,) in (3) are well-ordered. For a given lemma 
(E,, 8,), the role of fI is to introduce a well-ordering on the initial states of lemma 
(E,, 6,). The same effect can be obtained by considering not a single lemma (a,, 0,) 
but a family of lemmas { ( F~,,~,,~,, ~IQ,~) ): SES}. This point of view is more abstract 
in that only one well-ordering (IV<) need to be used. It is defined by 
(x’,,L(s’))+ <GAS)) if and only if (c~‘<~~v(cc’=cr~f,~(s’)<f,(s))) on 
W= { ( r,fz(s)): MEA A SES}. Hence, up to an isomorphism we can use ordinals and 
rephrase induction principle (3) as follows: 
[3AECM, &E(/l+(S+{tt,ff~)), &(A-+P+{tt,ff})), rlE(A-MO). 
(vS~S.3C(En.[(&,(S)=~(S))AvS’ES.(~,(S,S’)=~(S,S’))])A 
(vxEil.3z,E(n,+ 1+s2+{tt, ff})). 
Vi<n,, s,s’ES. 
C&,(S) * I2(s, s)l A 
[r;(s,s’)* 
(3S”ES.t(S’,S”)AvS”ES.[t(Sf,S”)=>3j<i.~h(S,S”)])V 
(31xr<r.[&~,(S’)AvS”ES.(H,,(S’,S”)~3j<i.Ija(S,S”))])V 
d,(S, s’)l)l. 
(4) 
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Theorem 7.2. (3) =S (4). 
Proof. (As, A,) well-ordered by the left lexicographic ordering is isomorphic with 
A, k A3 by the order-isomorphism ~(a, K) = [ A3 k CI 4 K] the inverse of which is (4, A). 
We choose A4=A3kA3, &q=~C(.C~S.[E3~(a)(S)Af34(a)(S)=~(CI)ll, e,=la.C4% 
S’).Ce31(or)(S,S’)Af3-(a)(S)=6(a)11, Q=~a.Q(,), 14~=~(s,s’).IIIs6~,)(s, S’)Af3&)(S)= 
S(~)l. 0 
Inevitability properties of programs have been specified as pairs (4, $) where 4 is 
a condition on initial states and II/ a relationship between initial and final states so as 
to adhere to the method introduced by Burstall [3]. However, a single binary relation 
is enough because $ is inevitable for ( S, t, 4 ) if and only if A(s, s’). [4(s) * $( s, s’)] is 
inevitable for (S, t, %s.tt>. Hence we derive the following more abstract induction 
principle: 
[%lEord, &(A+(S2+{tt, ff})), nE(A&+o). 
((Vs~S.3crEA.Vs’ES.[e,(s,s’)=(~(s)*~(s,s’))])A 
(VcXEA.3Z*E(n,+ 1+(S2+{tt,ff})). 
Vi< n,, s, s’ES. 
UT 
V-W 
(W 
(C) 
I?(& s) A 
[Zh(s,s’) *
(~S”ES.t(S’,Sf’)A~S”ES.[t(S’,S”)~3j<i.Zh(s,S”)])V 
(3c(‘<ct.vS”ES.[e,~(S’,S”)-3j<i.zj,(S,S”)])V 
us, s’)l)l. 
(5) 
Theorem 7.3. (4) = (5). 
Proof. Choose A 5 = A4, e5a(S,S’)=[&4a(~)je,,(s,s’)], n5=n4 and Z56(s,s’)= 
C&(S) * z‘t;(s,s’)l. 0 
If in induction principle (5) we consider the inevitability proof of a given lemma 0, 
and this proof can be obtained without (LI) then the verification conditions (P), (HS) 
and (C) strongly resemble the verification conditions corresponding to Floyd’s proof 
method [7] as formalized by induction principle (5) of Cousot and Cousot [4]. Stated 
otherwise, in invariant Z~(S,S’), i plays the role of the nonnegative integer which is 
strictly decremented at each program step. By comparison with Floyd’s method we 
observe that (5) imposes two unnecessary restrictions on i: n, is a bound on the number 
of program steps and this number is independent of the considered initial state, n, 
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(hence i) should be an integer (so that e.g. unbounded nondeterminism cannot be 
handled without (LI)). 
We first relax the first limitation, choosing n, as ordinal. 
Theorem 7.4. (a) (i) =S (i with n~( A +Ord)), i = 2, . . . ,5, 
(b) (i with nE(A-,Ord)-(i+ 1 with ne(A+Ord)), i=2, 3,4. 
Proof. (a) is obvious because uEOrd, hence cc) c Ord. (b) follows from the proofs of 
Theorems 7.1-7.3 which never use the fact that HEW but only that (nr+ 1,~) is well- 
founded (this remains valid when n,eOrd and n, + 1 is the ordinal successor of n,). 0 
We next relax the second limitation, choosing a possibly different maximum 
“number of program steps” for each initial state 5 (the “number of program steps” 
should not be understood to the letter but as rk(Acc(S, t, 4, $)(s), 
tlrnter(S,t,~,IC/)(S)-')(s)): 
[3nEOrd,BE(A~(S’,{tt,ff})),AEOrd,r~(n x A+(S’+{tt,ff})). 
(v’s~S.3n~ll.vS’ES.[e,(S,S’)=(~(S)~~(S,S’))])A 
(V~C(E A, s, s’ES, S’E A. 
ptkd.I;(s,s)] A 
[l;‘(s,s’)* 
(3s”ES.t(s’,s”) A VsNd.[t(s’, sU) => (3s”<s’.I:“(s,s”))]) v 
(3a’<cc.vs”~S.[e,~(s’,s”)~(~6”<6’.Ig”(s,s”))])v 
dar(s, ’)l)l. 
(6) 
Theorem 7.5. ((5) with n@A-+Ord)) * (6). 
Proof. Choose (1,=n,, Q6=05, A,=o, 16~(~,~‘)=[S<n501~15~(~,~‘)]. 0 
The use of well-orderings (or up to order-isomorphisms of ordinals) in (6) is not 
mandatory. Well-founded relations can as well serve as a basis for induction. 
Also as observed by Schwarz [12], Burstall’s method can be explained as the 
mathematical deduction of theorems from axioms specifying the effect of elementary 
commands in the program. This informal explanation of Burstall’s method can be 
formalized by considering the transition relation in the previous proof principles as 
a set of axioms or a given lemma from which other lemmas are derived. One difference 
(that had not to be taken into account by Schwarz [12], who considers only total 
deterministic programs) is that inevitability of t for (S, t, h.tt) holds only for states 
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which have at least one successor. Moreover, the deduction process that Schwarz [12] 
left unspecified is always reducible to transfinite induction. 
Finally, the main proposition E.(s, s’).[~(s) = $(s, s’)] can always be chosen as one 
of the lemmas intervening in the proof. 
Therefore, if we write Wj( W, --c, p) to state that --K is a well-founded relation on 
W with minimal element ,u, i.e. 
The above remarks lead to the following induction principle: 
rqn x A+(S2+t, ff})). 
Wfi(A, 4,p) A e,=tr\ Wf(A, <)Ae,=l”(S,S’).[~(S)~~(S,S’)]A 
(V’aE(A-p), S,S’ES,S’EA. 
[%Ed.I:(S,S)] A (7) 
[Id,‘(s,s’)* 
(&‘E/‘i.[d < MA([Ci’=/l] ==- [%“Es.8,,(S’,S”)]) 
Ab”ES.(&,(S’,S”)+ [%“ELi.(6”<d’A~;“(S,S”))])])V 
Let us remark that condition [cr’= ~1 under which [ 3s”ES.B,(s’, s”)] should 
hold is optional. When absent, the verification condition is simply redundant when 
Go#jA. 
Theorem 7.6. (6) =S (7). 
Proof. Choose &( A6 $1) (e.g. A6 i 2) and A7 =(A, i 1)~ { ,u}, ~4 + 7 M if and only if 
[a~(n,il)A((cr’=~)V(CL’E(/16/1)ACI’<tl))], n,=A,, A7=(A6u2), <,= <6= <, 
bh~S’)=[(~=PA t(S,S’))V(C(=A6A(~(S)~ICI(S,S’)))V(C(</16A &,(S,S’))i,~7:(S, 
S’)=[(ff=~)V(CI=~gA~=1AS’=S)V(~=/16A~=OA(~(S)~IC/(S,S’)))V(tl</16A 
I,: (s,s’))l. 0 
In induction principle (7) the verification condition (36~4 .Zi(s, s)] implies that 
lemma 8, is inevitable for (S, t, As.tt ). But for the main proposition 8, this property is 
not necessary. We need only the fact that tIa should be inevitable for the particular 
states for which it is used. Hence the verification condition [36~d.Z~(s,s)] of (7) 
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can be weakened in: 
{tat, ff})),n~A, AEOrd, IE(A x A+(S’+{tt, ff 
s,=~(s,s’).[~(s)~Ic/(s,s’)] A 
(vsLs.366A.I~(s,s))A 
(VrgA, s, s’ES, ~‘EA. 
[If’(s,s’) 3 
))I. 
Theorem 7.7. (7) * (8). 
(8) 
Proof. We first show that ifO<e,,<yandO<E1<;’ then(yj(6,)/&g<(yic61)i&1 if 
and only if ((6,<6,)v(6,=6, AQ,<E~)). 
If &<6, then (~ic6,)/~~<(~j(6~)ip=yic(6~/1)~yic6~<(~ic6~)i~~. If 
d0=6, AQ,<E~ then yic~?~=yic6,, hence (yA(50)~~0<(yAfil)/~1. 
Ifconversely,l((6,<6,)v(&,=6, r\E0<El))theneither6,=6, andEO=tz, sothat 
a=(yicbo)/~O=(yic61)i~1=Pand~4:Borelse(S,>6,)v(6,=6,~~,>~,)sothat 
by the first part of the proof (with 0 and 1 interchanged) we have p<sl, hence a+b. 
We next show that given a well-founded relation < on W, there is an injective and 
order-preserving map l( W,<) of W into the class (Ord, <) of ordinals. 
Let E( W,_OE(rk( W,<)-+{ X: X 5 W}) be defined by E( W,-<)(CC)={XE W: 
rk( W,-<)(x)=%}. Observe that VJcc,r’crk( W,<).[cr#a’=E( W,<)(a)n 
E( W,~)(C(‘)=C#J] and VXE W.jcrErk( w,<).[x~E( W,<)(a)]. 
By the axiom of choice, there is a linear ordering <(W,<)(x) which well-orders 
E( w, <)(a). 
Define p( W, -c)(x,y)=rk[E( W,<)(rx),+( W,-<)(rx)][y] where rx is 
rk( W,<)(x) and ~(W,--<)(x)=p( K +)( x,x)/l so that VXEW.[O<E(W, 
-c)(x)]. Define y( W,--c)=Sup+{~( W,~)(X): XE W} so that VXE W.[E( W, 
-c)(x) --c y( W,--c)] and I( W,-c)(x)=y( W,-c)ic rk( W, -c)(x)+4 W,-<)(x). 
If x<y then rk( W,<)(x)<rk( W,-<)(y); hence by the lemma 
I( W,<)(x) -c I( W,+)(y). If u=z( W,<)(x)=l( W,-c)(y)=ly then IX +zly and 
ly41x, so that by the lemma rk( W,--c)(x)=rk(W,d)(y) and E( W,-<)(x)= 
E( W,<)(y); therefore p( W,~)(x,x)=p( W,-c)(x,y). This implies that neither 
x4( W,<)(rx)y nor y@( W,d)(rx) x holds and, since x,y~E( W,<)(rx) which is 
linearly ordered by e( W,~)(rx), we conclude that x =y. 
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To prove that (7) * (8) is now immediate when choosing & =Sup + { I( d7 -p, 
-<7)(x): xE(&“P))I,%=r(n,-P, +7)(7-r,), ~8a(S,S’)=C3a~(n,-~). (E=r(n7-P, 
-<,)(u)A~~~(s,s’))],~~=SUP+~Z(~~, c7)(x): x~d,} and Is8(s,s’)=[3a~(n,-v~), 
dEA,. a=z(A,-p, -~~)(a)r\b=z(A,, -c7)(d)Al,;(s,.s’)]. 0 
The use of lemmas 0, in induction principle (8) is redundant because we can use 
instead some intermittent assertion Zz for some 6 such that I,d(s,s’) = oa(s, s’). By 
convention, we can choose 6=0 so that induction principle (8) can be simplified as 
follows: 
[UEOrd, TEA, AEOrd, IE(A x A-+(Sz-+(tt, R})). 
(vS,S’ES.I,O(S,S’)=(~(S)~~(S,S’)))A 
(v’sGS.36EA.z~(s,s))A 
(9) 
Theorem 7.8. (8) - (9). 
Proof. Choose &=A,, 7cg=7c8, Ag=As, ~,d,(S,S’)=[(6=OA&.(S,S’))V(6>OA 
MS, s’))l. 0 
As shown by the succession of transformations, the proof that in (9) a state s’ 
satisfying Zl’(s,s’) inevitably leads to a state s” such that Ba(s,s”) holds involve an 
induction along parts of computation paths modeled by 6’ and an induction upon the 
data modeled by CL In order to make a comparison with Floyd’s method, both cases 
can be reduced to computational induction using y’ measuring the “number of steps” 
remaining to be done between s’ and s”: 
[3TEOrd, 1~(T+(S’+{tt, ff I)), a~(r-tr). 
(0 (VS~S.3y~:r.[l,(S,S)AtiiS’ES.(l,(y)(S,S’)=[#(S)J~(S,S’)]])A 
(V/Y’EI-, s, S’ES. 
[Z,,,(s,s’)* (10) 
WW (3S”ES.t(S’,S”)AvS”ES.[t(S’,S”)s3y”<y’.(a(y”)=o(y’) 
AI,..(S,S”))])V 
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W) (3y<y’.[z,(s’,s’)AvS”ES.[z,(y,(S’,S”)~3y”<y’.(~(y”)=O(y’) 
A Z,~,(S,S”))])V 
((3 I m(y,,(S,S')l)l. 
Theorem 7.9. (9) =S (10). 
Proof. Let I = I.( cc, iS).[(d, k c()/6] be the order isomorphism between /19 x d9 
well-ordered by the left lexicographic ordering (~‘,6’) -K (IX, S) if and only if 
((a’<a)v(cr’=ccr\6’<6))andZ,,=d9ic&well-orderedby <.Welet(s,d)bethe 
inverse oflso that VCCE/~,, ~E~,.(c(=~(~((cc,~)))A~=~(z((c~,~)))) and V~EZ~~.‘J= 
I((&), 6(y))). We choose Zlor (s,~‘)=Z~$~~(s,s’) and o(y)=l((cr(y),O)). 0 
Using abstract generalization (10) of Burstall’s method we can make a fair compari- 
son with similar generalization of Floyd’s method [4]. For Floyd’s method, line (LI) is 
suppressed (so that one can always choose a(y)=O). Hence the crucial difference 
between Floyd’s and Burstall’s methods is not the use of invariant versus intermittent 
assertions, nor the use of computational induction versus induction upon the data 
but, indeed, the introduction of recursion. 
Equivalence of induction principles (2)-(10) follows from the following theorem. 
Theorem 7.10 (soundness). (10) * (0). 
Proof. We prove by induction on (Z, <) that V’~EZ.[VSES.V~EC(S,~,~S’.Z,(S,S’)). 
3i~Dom(p).Z,,,,(s,pi)]. Assume this holds for y’<y. By reductio ad absurdum let 
s~S,p~C(S,t,h’.Z,(s,s’)) be such that V’i~Dom(p).lZ,,,,(S,pi). To get a contra- 
diction we build an infinite sequence (( ik, yk): k 20) such that 
Vk>,O.[Z,,(s,p,,) A c~(y~)=c(y) A yk>yk+ i]. Choose yO=y and i0 =O. If the sequence 
is built up to point k then Zyl,(s,pir) satisfies (HS),(LI) or (C). (C) is impossible (since 
Z o(yk)(s,Pik) would imply Zocyi (S,pi,)). In case (HS), 3S”~S.t(pi~,s”) implies that 
&+i=(&+l)EDom(p). Hence r(pik,piril) implies 3y,+,<y,.(a(y,+1)=a(y,)= 
O(Y) A I,,+, (s, pi* + , )). In case (LI) there exists y ’ < yk such that I,,( pik) pin). Hence by 
induction hypothesis 3 j~Dom(p”“).Z,(,,,(p,+‘“,pf’“) (where p+j is the subsequence 
pj pj+ 1 . . of p). If we let ik+ 1 be ik +j it follows that Z,cy~i(pik, pik f 1 1 holds whence 
~Y~+~<Y~.CZ~,,I(S,P~*+I)A~(Y~+~)=~(Y~)=~(Y)I. Q.E.D. 
Now if pEC(S,f,@) then 3y~Z-.Z,(p~,p~) so that p~C(S,r,E.s’.Z.,(p,,s’)) and by 
the above lemma 3i~Dom(p).l,(,,(p,,pi). By (P) this implies #(po) * $(p,,pi), hence 
ti(PO>Pi). q 
8. Strong semantic completeness 
The semantic completeness argument given in Theorem 6.4 is very weak because it 
essentially consists in saying that (2) can always be used to formulate “a la Floyd” 
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proofs (as suggested by Manna and Waldinger [lo]). Having extended Burstall’s 
method so as to incorporate Floyd’s method (see Theorem 7.4 and (6)-(10)) the usual 
semantic completeness argument for Floyd’s method can be transcribed for Burstall’s 
method (e.g. (0) * ((10) with (LI) suppressed (and o(y)=O)) as proved in [4]). How- 
ever such completeness arguments are not in the spirit of Burstall [3], who encourages 
the decomposition of proofs of propositions into lemmas as opposed to Floyd [7], 
who proves a single proposition (decomposed into partial correctness, absence of 
blocking states and termination, a decomposition which is also applicable to each 
lemma involved in Burstall’s method). 
We now give a stronger semantic completeness result showing that the lemmas 
involved in “a la Burstall” proofs can always be chosen more freely. 
First we have to introduce an induction principle (11) where the choice between 
“hand simulation” (HS) and “a little induction” (LI) is enforced. In particular, the 
lemmas that are to be used in (LI) should be imposed. For that purpose we consider 
a version of (6) where we introduce a choice relation lJs,s’,cr’) so that intermittent 
assertion Zi’(s, s’) can be handled using lemma CI’ < CI if and only if ioL( s, s’, a’) holds. 
(Observe that a dependence of z on 6’ would only be useful to impose the use of 
identity lemmas, a case of little importance that we exclude for simplicity). 
To simplify later reasonings, (HS) will be treated in the style of (7) as a particular 
subcase of (LI) so that the transition relation t is viewed as a particular lemma, say QO, 
given as axiom. 
Moreover, as observed for (S), the verification condition [36~d .If(s, s)] of (6) or (7) 
implies that lemma 8, is inevitable for (S, t, h.tt ). However, this is needed only for the 
particular states s for which 8, may be used, i.e. when 3~ <tl, s’~S.z,,(s’, s, a). 
Finally, since all lemmas enjoy the same kind of inevitability properties there is no 
real need to distinguish a particular main proposition. 
These remarks lead to the following induction principle (where AEOrd, 
~9~(A-+(S~+{tt,ff})), 8,=t and ~E(A~O-+(SXSXA~{~~,~~}))): 
[SlEOrd, Is((A-0) x d+(S2+{tt, ff})). 
(VC(E(A-O), SES.[(3c(‘E(L4-O), S’ES.Z,~(S’,S,tl))~36~4.f~(S,S)])A 
(VE(A-O), S,S’ES, S’EA. 
[Z2’(s,s’) =a 
(11) 
152 P. Cousot. R. Cousot 
We first show that (I 1) is yet another formulation of the induction principles 
generalizing But-stall’s method. 
Theorem 8.1 (Equivalence of the induction principles). (6) * [3A, 8, I.( do = t A (1 l))]. 
Proof. Choose A,,=l-kA,, d,,=d,, O1lO=t, if cc,a’~A, then 6)11(1:.,=0ga, 
I 11~;~or)(S,S’)=[16~‘(S,S’)AvbEd6.(1~~(S,S’)=J~’dS)],Ill(l;a)(S,S’,O)=[36’Ed~. 
I 11P;Fa)(S,S’)AlB6~(S,S’)A3S”ES.t(S’,S”)AvS”ES.(t(S’,S”) *ps”<s’.r,,6”(S,S”)])] 
and I Il(lia)(S,S’,1/X’)=[36’Edg.I ~~~;;Z,(S,S’)Al~e6a(S,S’)Avs”ES.(06a’(S’,S”)~ 
[36”<6’.Z,f”(S,S”)])]. 0 
Theorem 8.2 (Equivalence of the induction principles (continued)). 
[3/1,e,~,n~(n-o).(vs~S.~,(s,s,7()=ttAB,=~(s,s’).[~(s)~~(s,s’)] 
Ae,=tA(ll))]*@). 
Proof. Choose A 8 = ‘4, , , 8s,(s,S’)=ifCI=Othenttelse8,,.(s,s’),71g=7111,dg=dl1, 
18~(s,s’)=ifa=0 then ff else Illf(s,s’). 0 
Because we no longer distinguish a main proposition 8, as in (0), soundness of (11) is 
better formulated as follows: 
V%E(/t-O), p~~(S,t,i.S.[3a’,S’.I,‘(S’,S,~)]).3i~Dom(p).B,(p,,pi). (12) 
Theorem 8.3 (Soundness (relative to t)). (11) * (12). 
Proof. Follows from the later proved Theorems 8.5 and 8.6. 0 
We are mainly concerned about the semantic completeness of (11). The reciprocal of 
Theorem 8.3 is not true. 
Theorem 8.4 (Insufficient completeness condition). (12) + (11). 
Proof. Consider the counterexampleS=ja,b,c}, t(s,s’)=[(s=a~s’=b)v(s=b~s’ 
=c)],/1=3,8,=t,~,(s,s’)=[s=a~s’=c],~~(~,~’)=[~=aAs=b],A#O,~,(s,s’,r’)= 
[(c~=l As=aAs’E{a,bj Ad=O)V(Ct=2AS’=S=UAdE{1,2j)]. 
Obviously, (12) holds. If (11) were true then we would have z,(u,u, 2) hence 
36,~d.I$‘(u,a) and by r2(u,u,1) and @,(a,~) we would have 36,<6,.1F(u,c). But 
1 Q,( a, c) and V'cr ’ < 2.1 12( a, c, a’), a contradiction. 0 
In Burstall’s method the use of lemma fI1 in the proof of proposition 6, has the effect 
of covering a number of transitions by a single step 8,. Hence 8, can be used in the 
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proof of 0, only if this reduction leaves 0, inevitable. Stated otherwise, 0, must be 
inevitable for transitions O1 made up of the lemmas that are used in the proof of 0,. 
This is expressed more formally by condition (where O,, = t): 
VcX(/i-O), s~S.[(3CL’E/1,S’ES.z,,(Sf,S,CI)) 
~(~P~~(S,~,,,~~.CS=~l>.~i~~~~(~).~a(Po,Pi))l, (13) 
where z,,(s’,s”)=[3a’~cc.~,(s,s’,cc’)~O,.(s’,s”)]. 
Condition (13) is a necessary one for semantic completeness: 
Theorem 8.5 (Soundness (relative to r) - necessary completeness condition)). 
(11)*(13). 
Proof. Assume (11). If /1= 1 or VU’, s’.l la,(s’, s, U) then (13) obviously holds, else we 
prove (13) by transfinite induction on cre(/l-0). Given ae(n-0) and s~S, assume 
by reductio ad absurdum that 3tl’~/i, s’~S,pgC( S, ~as,~~.[~=~]).la,(~‘,~,~) A 
V’i~Dom(p).lO,(p,,pi). To get a contradiction, we show that it is then possible to 
build an infinite sequence ((6,, ik): ka0) such that Vk>O.Z,dk(s,pi,) holds and (6,: 
k30) is an infinite strictly decreasing chain of ordinals. 
We have z,,(s’,s,M) so that by (11) we derive I$‘(s,s) i.e. 12(s,pi,) with iO=O. If the 
sequence has been built up to point k, then by (11) Z$(s,pir) implies 
([~~<~.l~(S,Pi,,~)]A[V~‘<C1.1*(S,Pik~~’)~([ff’=O~3S”ES.O~ (pi,,S”)] 
A [V~“ES.(O,‘(pi,,S”) * 3S”<6,. Zt”(S, S”))])]) 
because we have assumed 10a(Po,Pik) and p,,=s. If cl=0 then ~s”ES.O,(pi,,s”) 
whence ~s”ES.~~JP~~,S”). Else O<g<cr, so that by induction hypothesis Vs’~S.[(3c(“, 
S”.l,-(s”, S’,~))~(V$EC<S,T ,,,,&.[~=s’]).GliEDom(p’).O,(pb,p:))]. In particular 
fors’=pc3ra(s,ph,~)holdsandZ(S,r ap,,, &.[s=pJ) is not empty so that we derive 
3S”ES.0~(pik,s”), whence 3S”ES.ras(Pikrs”). Since pik is not a blocking state 
ik+ 1 =it+ 1 belongs to Dam(p) and we have ras(pik,Pik+,). It follows that 
3cl’<a.I,(s,pi~,CI’)AOBa,(pir,piktt)) whence 36k+1<6k.I~+l(~,~i~+~). q 
Condition (13) (i.e. each lemma is inevitable relatively to the lemmas used in its 
proof) implies condition (12) (i.e. each lemma is inevitable relatively to the transition 
system): 
Theorem 8.6 (Inevitability relative to z implies inevitability relative to t). (13) * (12). 
Proof. Assume (13), we prove (12) by transfinite induction on @A -0). Assume 
by reductio ad absurdum, that 3peC(S, t,h.[3a’,s’.l,,(s’,s,a)]). VieDom(p). 
10,(pO,pi). To get a contradiction, we shall build an infinite sequence (i,: k>O) 
such that piOpi, . . . is a counterexample to (13), i.e. Zlcr’, s’ .r,,(s’,piO, rx) A 
Vk~0.[Sapi,(Pir,Pir+1)A108,(Pi,,Pik)]. We let it, be 0. If the sequence is built up to ik 
154 P. Cousot. R. Cousot 
then it can be extended since 3ik +, 2 ik. zapLo (pi,, pi, + 1 1 (and 1 fl,( pi”, pi,) by hypothesis 
and i,=O). Otherwise, Vj>,ik.lTrp,,(pik,pj) so that by definition of rRP,_ we would 
have V~>,ik.VM’<C(.[l~a(po,~i~,M’)Vi~a,(pi~,pj)]. If Vg’<X.ll,(p,,pi,,a’) then 
VS’ES.lZap,o(pik,S’) SO that Pio...PirEC(S,~.lp,~, j.2. [S=pio] ), in contradiction 
with (13). Else ~c(‘<cc.z~(~~,~~~,cc’); so for that r’<z we derive Vj>i,.16,,(pi,,pj), 
hence Pir,Pik + I . ..d( S, t, j.s.[Sx”, s”. la..(s”, s, x’)]), in contradiction with induction 
hypothesis (12). 0 
We can now give a necessary and sufficient semantic completeness conditionfor (11). 
Theorem 8.7 (Necessary and sufficient strong completeness condition). (13) 0 (11). 
Proof. By Theorem 8.5 we just have to prove (13)*(11). Given r~(n-O), SES, we 
define: 
0 Inas= u { Inter(S,T,,, &.tt,d,)(s): 3r’EA,s’ES.z,,(S’,s,C()}, 
l G~~~=~{Goaf(S,z,,, i_~.tt,Q,)(s): ~cI’EA,s’ES.I,,(S’,S,I)}, 
l AC,, = Inas u Go,,. 
We first prove that (13) + (Vae(n -0) SES. Wf(Ac,,, t,,j In,,-‘)). 
This is obvious when tix’~n,s’~S.l~,,(s’,s,~~) since AC,, is empty. Else, given 
x~(il-0) and SCS such that ~cx’E~,s’ES.I,,(S’,S, 2) assume, by reductio ad absurdum, 
that 3p~(o~Ac,,).Vi~o.t,,11n,,(pi,pi+l). For all i~:w we have piEIn,, SO that 
1(3,( s, pi), hence pi+ Go,,. Since pot In,, we can assume p. = s (else we can adjoin to 
the left of p a prefix r,, . ..rk of some trace I.EZ(S,T,,,&.~~) such that 
ro=sr\Vjdk.lB,(ro,rj)r\rk=pO SO that Vi < k. ~~~1 In,,( ri, ri+ 1)). We have 
~c~‘E/~,s’ES.I,,(S’,S,X) and ~EZ(S,T zs, 22. [s=s]) and V’i~D0m(p).pi@G0,, hence 
~0~(p~,p~), in contradiction with (13). Q.E.D. 
Assuming (13), by the previous lemma we can define: 
l d=S~p’{rk(Ac,,,~,,1In,,-‘): a~(ii-O)ASSES~, 
l I~‘(s,s’)=[s’EAc,,Afi’=rk(Ac,,,~,,lln,,ml)(s’)]. 
If ZE(/~-O), SES and C!C(‘E(~ -0) s’~S.~,,(s’,s,r) then SEAC,, so that Zi(s,s) holds 
with 6=rk(Ac,,,zZsl In,,-‘)(s). 
Assume CCE(L~-O), s,s’~S, 6’~d and Z~‘(S,S’). We have s’EAc,,. If s’EGo,, then 
oa(s, s’) holds. Else s’EIn,, so that by (13) there exists S”ES such that T,,( s’, s”), hence 
some c~‘<tl such that I~(s,s’,x’) A (~,.(s’,s”). If a’=0 we conclude Ys”eS.t(s’,s”) since 
&=t. Else r’#O and if Vs”~S.~t(s’,s”) then (s’)EZ(S,~,~.S’.[~~~,S.I,(S,S’,~’)]), 
whence by (13) and Theorem 8.6 we conclude from (12) that ~,,(s,s’); hence T&s’,s’) 
holds. It follows from s’E In,, that 3sr,~P~C(S,T,,,;.s.[s=s]>, 
i~Dom(p).l,(~s,a)AVjdi.lB,(p~,Pj)APk=.S’, SO that the infinite trace 
p. . ..pks’s’... is a counterexample to (13). Hence, by reductio ad absurdum we 
conclude that 3s”ES. t(s’, s”). Finally, given x’ -C c( and S”ES such that I,(& s’, LX’) and 
~,,(s’,s”) we have ~l~n,,(s',~") hence s ” E AC,, and there exists 
6” =rk( AC,,, ~,,l Inas -l)(s”)<rk(Ac,,,rl,lIn,,m’)(s’)=fi’ such that Ii”(s,s”) 
holds. q 
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In a related paper [5], we show that Floyd’s method (i.e. (2) without (LI)) and 
Burstall’s method (more precisely (2)) are strongly equivalent in the sense that a proof 
by one method can be translated into a proof by the other method. 
9. Conclusion 
Our study and generalization of Burstall’s method should be extended (e.g. in the 
style of [4]) so as to take fairness hypotheses for parallel programs into account. It 
should also be extended from a methodological point of view in order to obtain better 
presentations of Burstall’s method and broader applications e.g. for logic programs. 
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